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Mostrando las entradas con la etiqueta Nicolas Maduro. Mostrar todas las entradas
Mostrando las entradas con la etiqueta Nicolas Maduro. Mostrar todas las entradas

jueves, 9 de noviembre de 2017

DEMOCRACIA EN VENEZUELA - ¿CÓMO LOGRAR EL OBJETIVO DESEADO? (UN ENFOQUE ESTRATÉGICO)


El régimen encabezado por Nicolás Maduro se fortalece a medida que destruye el proceso electoral y la representatividad pluralista en el país. El modelo social y económico del régimen hunde cada vez más al país en miseria y no parece haber salida. La oposición demócrata se debilita y busca alternativas para restaurar al país con el objetivo simple de cualquier demócrata: crear las condiciones para que existan democracia y libertad, bases de la prosperidad y el bienestar.
En un momento se pensó que era posible obtener el cambio y las condiciones haciendo una coalición electoral opositora y enfrentando al oficialismo en contienda directa. El régimen se endurece ante la debilidad de la voluntad del compromiso ciudadano de votar, y esa vía está arrinconada en un callejón sin salida debido a las argucias y manipulaciones del mismo régimen. Aun así la vía electoral no debe descartarse por completo.
Hay quien está esperando que algún sector de las Fuerzas Armadas se harte del desastre económico, administrativo y fiscal de un régimen secuestrado por delincuentes, y que de alguna manera ponga orden.  Esta vía es un callejón sin destino conocido. Tanto adeptos al modelo y legado del “Comandante Eterno” como algunos que puedan permanecer en el seno castrense opuestos a dicho legado pudiesen hacer intentos que difícilmente lograrán sacudir al régimen en el poder, dado su apoyo externo por el régimen cubano. Aun así no debe descartarse la necesidad del apoyo de sectores en las FF.AA. durante el proceso de restauración de las condiciones democráticas del país.
Unos últimos suponen que una posible intervención extranjera de corte militar, sea como “operación quirúrgica” o sea como un “cuerpo multinacional de cascos azules” pudiese lograr el cambio de condición necesario. Una intervención de este tipo se puede saber cuándo comienza, pero no cuando termina y es un camino incierto y volátil. Aun así no debe descartarse el apoyo de los aliados internacionales que reconocen a la democracia plena como fundamental para la libertad.
El primer enfoque, el enfoque electoral, es el más cercano al objetivo de crear, preservar y fortalecer la democracia. La MUD como agrupación electoral con el objetivo de retar al oficialismo tuvo su momento y razón de ser. Las energías opositoras eran suficientemente fuertes como para suponer que una oposición unida derrotaría a la coalición oficialista en las urnas y eso efectivamente sucedió. Las elecciones del 2013 que llevaron al poder a Maduro fueron ganadas por la oposición, como ha sido admitido por personas cercanas a dicha elección. El fraude electoral derrotó al candidato de la MUD, y cuando hacía falta no se utilizaron las otras armas de la democracia y la sociedad civil: protesta popular, denuncia de la prensa, apoyo de ONGs independientes y aliados internacionales, etc., por fallas del liderazgo opositor.
Los resultados de las elecciones parlamentarias del 2015 fueron tan abrumadoramente en contra del oficialismo que reflejan el verdadero sentimiento del país en relación con la gestión de gobierno. El resultado fue tan contundente que sobrepasó la posibilidad de fraude que existe cuando los márgenes son menores al 5% del electorado. Dos lecciones de estos comicios son importantes: que la participación electoral masiva es posible e importante, y que las entropías intrínsecas a la coalición electoral de la MUD no son conducentes a una gestión efectiva. El fracaso en la gestión de la Asamblea Nacional  para imponer el estado democrático es directamente atribuible a esa entropía.
Como he definido en otro lugar, los partidos son agrupaciones de personas con ideología compartida con el objetivo de llegar o de influenciar al poder. Las diferencias ideológicas entre partidos eventualmente desintegrarán una coalición opositora como la MUD, tal y como ocurrió. Un grave error de percepción tanto de dirigentes dentro de la MUD como del electorado, comentaristas y observadores es haber considerado a la MUD como un partido político y querer operar o tener expectativas de que se comportara como tal. La coalición electoral de la MUD no agrupa personas con ideología compartida, agrupa partidos con el objetivo de crear condiciones para una contienda electoral democrática y, dentro de esos partidos, individuos con ambiciones personales pragmáticas. El problema es que en dicha agrupación algunos suponían un grado de observancia y obediencia política de sus miembros que no es realista. Aun cuando se hicieran primarias para escoger un candidato único de oposición, es probable que hubiese opositores que no votarían por dicho candidato en la elección general por muchas razones, y todas relacionadas con el amplio espectro ideológico de los partidos políticos que contiene la oposición.
Las elecciones regionales del 15 de octubre resaltaron las debilidades estructurales de este enfoque y su caducidad. Tanto por el endurecimiento del régimen y sus destrezas en perpetrar manipulación y fraude electoral como por el fraccionamiento natural de la coalición electoral opositora, hay que llegar a la conclusión que la vía electoral planteada como contienda entre una agrupación oficialista y una agrupación opositora está cerrada. Eso no significa que la vía democrática está cerrada.
Si se ven las cifras de participación del electorado, puede verse que los grupos aglutinados por el oficialismo nunca han superado mucho más del 33% del registro electoral en todas las elecciones desde las de 1998. Ante esa realidad numérica, en caso de persistir por la vía electoral, sería más efectivo competir separadamente, enfocarse en aumentar la participación electoral, y gobernar coordinadamente, es decir un nuevo “pacto de Punto Fijo”. Pero esto solo podrá ocurrir en caso de tener contiendas electorales imparciales, para lo cual las condiciones no existen en la actualidad.
Democracia es una condición en la cual la ciudadanía participa en el gobierno. Esta participación se manifiesta mediante elecciones, mediante protestas, en agrupaciones civiles de interés focalizado (federaciones, sindicatos, asociaciones, organizaciones, iglesias) y por supuesto con prensa tanto libre como clandestina. Las elecciones en este momento en Venezuela han sido apropiadas/secuestradas por el régimen. Las otras armas de la democracia se mantienen vigentes. Para recuperar la plena democracia en Venezuela hay que recuperar las elecciones libres e imparciales y ese debe ser el objetivo tanto de la aplicación de las otras armas de la democracia como de los otros dos enfoques mencionados al principio. Una vez recuperadas las elecciones, entonces podrán debatirse las ideologías y sus variantes entre sí, incluyendo social democracia, democracia cristiana, liberalismo, e incluso el comunismo en su ropaje chavista demócrata.
El segundo enfoque, un levantamiento militar, se basa sobre la ilusión de que el poder militar es el árbitro final de la democracia en el país. Esto tiene raíces en varias líneas culturales y de pensamiento, pero todas derivan de la añoranza paternalista por el liderazgo fuerte y de la asociación mental (por demás lógica) de las armas con el poder. La ciudadanía y el poder civil no pueden claudicar ante esta ilusión. El alto riesgo que implica dejar en manos de unos pocos ambiciosos (armados) los destinos del país nunca ha tenido resultados positivos—ni en Venezuela ni en ningún otro país del mundo. Los proponentes de este enfoque dan por sentado que salir del régimen por cualquier vía es esencial, pero no se les puede hacer un llamado a “los militares” para que tumben al gobierno sin un resultado planificado y con un sentido estratégico. Es probable que existan militares ambiciosos que piensan que el legado de Chávez está siendo traicionado y que ellos pueden poner mano dura para proteger dicho legado. Eso sería un desastre para las verdaderas aspiraciones democráticas del país.
Las Fuerzas Armadas se han convertido en un gran pulpo multipropósito. Su injerencia en el sector civil es agigantada y creciente, profundizando el objetivo de Chávez de establecer un gobierno “cívico-militar,” modelado bajo el mismo tipo de estructura existente en Cuba. Esto ha resultado que Venezuela fácilmente tenga el mayor número de generales per cápita a nivel mundial (salvo, quizás, Cuba). Esto—al mismo tiempo que hace pensar que existe un gran poderío militar—es una gran debilidad.
El sector militar con mando efectivo de tropas en Venezuela es proporcionalmente menor que en un gobierno civil. El sector civil democrático debe tomar la iniciativa de cambiar el poder y buscar alianzas con el sector militar con mando de tropas. El cambio democrático tiene que surgir del sector civil, y algunos sectores militares aliarse al movimiento. No debe ser lo contrario, puesto que esa vía es conducente a una nueva represión totalitaria. Es decir, no se descarta la necesidad de una alianza con algún sector militar opuesto al régimen, pero esta alianza debe ser iniciativa civil, demócrata y liderada por dichos demócratas civiles, no al revés. Los militares se deben sumar a la inercia positiva de un movimiento que busca restaurar las condiciones de democracia, tal y como ha sucedido históricamente en toda transición hacia una democracia exitosa, puesto que esta será la única manera de defenderse de la represión brutal que surgirá del régimen ante la posibilidad de enfrentarse a su final.
Por último el tercer enfoque, el de intervencionismo militar extranjero debe ser discutido. Hay quienes piensan que dado que la vía electoral está trancada y que “los militares del país están vendidos al régimen”, no hay opción posible salvo una intervención militar extranjera que “cure el cáncer” que aflige al país; que no hay solución interna posible. El argumento a favor de esta opción postula que el liderazgo político en el país es inefectivo y nunca podrá salir del régimen. Esta opción es una variante del segundo enfoque, salvo que descarta la posibilidad que los militares en el país tomen acción en contra del régimen, y por ello solicitan su equivalente extranjero.
Suponer que esta medida desesperada de alguna manera pueda resultar en un resultado positivo para el país, es una falacia. Una intervención de este tipo fraccionaría aún más el país entre enemigos acérrimos, y precipitaría una verdadera guerra entre “nacionalistas”, “patriotas”, “independentistas”, “defensores”, y cualquier otro auto-nombrado que se sienta con derecho a opinar mediante un fusil, saliendo a la calle. Adicionalmente, los intereses geopolíticos de Cuba, Rusia y China harían del conflicto uno excesivamente cruento y largo. Este es un escenario que tendría una fecha de inicio con acciones concretas y ciertas, pero una fecha final totalmente desconocida con resultados inciertos. Para los proponentes de esta opción una consecuencia certera sería la eliminación de cualquier semblanza o personaje del liderazgo de la oposición política actual, sea por descrédito o físicamente.
El apoyo internacional para el cambio del régimen en Venezuela es esencial y dicho apoyo ha presionado de manera efectiva hasta ahora. Las sanciones individuales y corporativas están cercando al régimen. El reconocimiento a la Asamblea Nacional y al Tribunal Supremo en exilio –y el desconocimiento a la Asamblea Nacional Constituyente—son de gran ayuda para lograr una transición política; la comunidad está a la espera de un nuevo Consejo Nacional Electoral. 
No se podrá salir del régimen sin lograr un acuerdo con el régimen cubano y en eso la comunidad internacional es fundamental. No se podrá salir del régimen (lamentablemente) sin obtener un lugar al cual dirigentes del régimen puedan “escaparse”, para lo cual transacciones internacionales hacen falta. No se puede recuperar la economía del país, enfrentarse al problema de la deuda, ni obtener la ayuda humanitaria necesaria sin la comunidad internacional. No se podrá convocar elecciones percibidas como imparciales sin colaboración internacional. Esos son los enlaces, acciones y apoyos que hacen falta construir, no una intervención militar internacional que acrecentaría el caos y la destrucción.
El objetivo es crear las condiciones para que existan democracia y libertad. La combinación estratégica de los tres enfoques discutidos es necesaria para crear estas condiciones. Cada uno es una pieza del rompecabezas que debe ser armado por el cuerpo civil democrático del país. Sin este trio de acciones coordinadas estratégicamente, el régimen se mantendrá por el futuro previsible y el país caerá en mayor miseria, esa miseria que no permite otra acción sino las de la supervivencia del día a día.

lunes, 19 de diciembre de 2016

La Violencia en Venezuela: Fractura Intencionada

“Hoy en día, sin embargo, tenemos que decir que un estado es una comunidad humana que (exitosamente) reclama el monopolio sobre el uso legítimo de la fuerza física sobre un territorio determinado.”
 – Max Weber

En el lenguaje de Weber, fuerza física se refiere a violencia y es así como se ha interpretado desde que esas palabras fuesen dichas en un discurso en la entreguerra del S. XX en Alemania. Aclara Weber que el uso legítimo es la defensa del orden público y las fronteras, y que el estado delega en sus representantes (policía, etc.) ese uso dentro del marco de un estado de derecho: “…el derecho al uso de fuerza física se asigna a otras instituciones o individuos solo hasta el nivel que el estado lo permita.”

Los resultados indican que Chávez fue un político sagaz. Llegó y se mantuvo en el poder manteniendo un espejismo de democracia mientras consolidaba una autocracia partidista para encaminar al país hacia su proyecto socialista marxista basado en el modelo cubano. A 24 años de su primer intento golpista de tomar el poder, Venezuela tiene el modelo político y de gobierno cubano en plena vigencia, su (fallido) modelo económico en avanzado proceso de implementación, y un modelo social en caos. También, sin duda, fue un político con suerte. Su mayor suerte es...



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ESTE ENSAYO Y OTROS ESTÁN DISPONIBLES EN SU TOTALIDAD EN
LA VENEZUELA IMPOSIBLE: 





sábado, 6 de junio de 2015

Cuando las Mayorías Pierden.

To read this essay in English click here.

La fecha no está anunciada aún, pero aparte de la muy verdadera posibilidad de fraude, hay razones estructurales por las cuales hay gran probabilidad de que el chavismo mantenga el control de la Asamblea Nacional en las elecciones venideras. Datanálisis arroja que alrededor del ochenta por ciento del universo votante en Venezuela se opone al gobierno de Nicolás Maduro. Esto haría pensar que las elecciones parlamentarias serán arrasadas por la oposición. Sin embargo, estar contra Maduro no es necesariamente ser antichavista.   Los opositores al chavismo, sumados a los opositores de Maduro suman gran mayoría pero no necesariamente eso hará que la Asamblea Nacional electa este año sea antichavista.

El Universo electoral se puede dividir en cuatro grandes grupos: Chavistas pro-maduro, Chavistas anti-maduro, Antichavistas pro-MUD, y Antichavistas anti-MUD. Los grupos chavistas...




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ESTE ENSAYO Y OTROS ESTÁN DISPONIBLES EN SU TOTALIDAD EN
LA VENEZUELA IMPOSIBLE: 

miércoles, 6 de mayo de 2015

La Igualdad, la Libertad y la Felicidad

Click here to read this essay in English.

El Acta de Independencia de Venezuela, entre sus justificativos para romper con el gobierno español, incluye uno de los primeros reclamos registrados oficialmente por escrito contra la demagogia y las promesas incumplidas, derivado directamente de un lema de la revolución francesa la cual, irónicamente, había conducido al gobierno con el cual rompía ahora la Capitanía General de Venezuela:

“…nos prometían la libertad, la igualdad y la fraternidad, en discursos pomposos y frases estudiadas, para encubrir el lazo de una representación amañada, inútil y degradante.”

Es así como los conceptos de igualdad y libertad se encuentran en el origen de la nación venezolana—y en las numerosas y sangrientas pugnas fratricidas subsiguientes que ha sufrido desde el 5 de julio de 1811.

Si en lugar de evidentemente complementarios analizamos estos derechos universales como complejamente antagónicos, podemos entender algo mejor el porqué de dichas pugnas y su efecto sobre la felicidad del país.


El Marxismo como Base de la Justicia Social


El debate sobre justicia social tiene entre sus fundamentos principales la premisa de la igualdad del hombre con sus semejantes. Dicha premisa obliga moralmente a la empatía cuando existe desigualdad y busca remediar la condición y aliviar el sufrimiento de los más desafortunados. El corolario de esta línea de pensamiento es...


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ESTE ENSAYO Y OTROS ESTÁN DISPONIBLES EN SU TOTALIDAD EN
LA VENEZUELA IMPOSIBLE: 

martes, 24 de marzo de 2015

El Robo Mayor (2)*

Un País para Querer

Read this essay in English

Siendo joven, una de mis actividades favoritas era recorrer Venezuela. Cuando niño, con mis padres y mis tíos, rodé por esas carreteras, yendo a playas  tanto cercanas como lejanas – Macuto, Naiguatá, Cata, La Restinga… Por el alto llano de Barinas y las montañas de los Andes… y Guayana, sobre el Puente Angostura y hasta el Guri.

Ya algo mayor hacía excursiones frecuentes al Ávila, trasnochando en la Silla de Caracas con amigos de escuela y luego, como joven profesional soltero con compañeros de parranda, reinicié esos recorridos por el país, por Venezuela. Durmiendo en pensiones de mala muerte en San Fernando de Apure o amaneciendo en el carro con dolor de cabeza por el aire enrarecido del Páramo de Mucuchíes; parado sobre piedras del precipicio al final de la península de Araya o acampando en las arenas de Paraguaná con mi hermano, viendo a lo lejos el resplandor nocturno de Amuay. Pisé guano en El Guácharo. Visité reinas de belleza en Barquisimeto. Tomé menjurjes, cervezas y ron en Sorte, Guasdualito y San Francisco de Yare. Comí nieve en el Pico Espejo y caminé tempranas nieblas merideñas junto a mi joven y bella esposa venezolana. Experiencias inolvidables.

Las gentes de Venezuela éramos una sola gente. Andinos o margariteños, maracuchos o guayaneses, caraqueños o llaneros, todos queríamos lo mismo: una mejor Venezuela, un mejor futuro. El anhelo común de todo ser humano. 



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ESTE ENSAYO Y OTROS ESTÁN DISPONIBLES EN SU TOTALIDAD EN
LA VENEZUELA IMPOSIBLE: 

miércoles, 11 de marzo de 2015

La Locura del Liderazgo

To read this essay in English, click here.

El del Sur.

Los Estados Unidos fueron atacados el lunes 24 de noviembre del 2014. El mayor ataque cibernético que se haya perpetrado hasta la fecha puso de rodillas a una gran corporación y afectó a miles de personas. El ataque a Sony se ha determinado con 99% de certeza que se originó en Corea del Norte, su líder motivado por la percepción de haber sido atacado primero  por unos jóvenes cineastas comediantes de Hollywood con insultos a su arrogancia y pomposidad. Hasta esas alturas, las trágicas y caricaturescas payasadas de Kim Jung-Un, el "Líder Supremo", habían sido ignoradas en su mayoría por el pueblo estadounidense. Aun cuando el impacto directo para Sony parece moderado en contexto (se estima en alrededor de 15 millones de dólares), el impacto a compañías y agencias obligadas a incrementar su seguridad cibernética, el impacto personal a personas asociadas pero no parte directa de Sony, y el trauma psíquico sobre toda la ciudadanía norte-americana, no es cuantificable. Todo porque un desatado solitario se enojó con los EE. UU.
La locura del liderazgo no es exclusiva a tierras del Lejano Oriente. Enfrentando pobreza masiva, hambre, y un deterioro en calidad de vida que va desde la salud hasta la seguridad personal, el gobierno de Nicolás Maduro en Venezuela ha reiterado el lema populista favorito: la culpa es de ‘LOS OTROS’. Sean internos (burguesitos), externos (el Imperio) y/o en combinación conspirativa. Sin embargo, la falta de soluciones verdaderas para los problemas cada día más numerosos que sufre el país está resultando en un aumento desenfrenado de la autocracia represiva en intentos fallidos de control, y puede conducir a acciones virulentas e irracionales en contra de los Estados Unidos.

El Sr. Maduro es un personaje pintoresco. Persiguiendo la sombra de su carismático y más pintoresco mentor, el fallecido Hugo Chávez, Maduro no da la talla ante el ídolo muerto. Y no porque no lo haya intentado. En estilo de dinastía electoral se autocalifica “Hijo de Chávez”; declara que el espíritu de Chávez le habla en forma de pajarito; toca cuatro durante mítines; y en conferencias de prensa y cadenas televisivas imita el estilo paternalista y condescendiente de los discursos de El Difunto.
Sin embargo, la visión nostálgica de los chavistas siempre verá a Maduro como inadecuado en comparación: no se puede competir con El Muerto. El chavismo...


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ESTE ENSAYO Y OTROS ESTÁN DISPONIBLES EN SU TOTALIDAD EN
LA VENEZUELA IMPOSIBLE: 

viernes, 6 de marzo de 2015

The Madness of Leadership.


The One South of Us.

On Monday November 24th 2014, the US was attacked.  The largest ever cyberattack to date brought a major corporation to its knees and affected the lives of thousands of people.  The Sony hack has been determined with 99% certainty to have come from North Korea, motivated by a perceived attack on its arrogance and self-importance by some comedy filmmakers in Hollywood.  Up to then, the tragic cartoonish buffoonery of the Supreme Leader, Kim Jung-Un, had been dismissed in America as innocuous for the most part.  While the direct financial impact on Sony is reported at $15M, the overall impact on all corporations and agencies now boosting cyber-security, the personal impact on people associated but not part of Sony, and the gut impact on the American psyche is unquantifiable. All because one rogue person got mad at the US.

The madness of leadership is not singular to faraway lands.  Faced with mass poverty, starvation and deteriorating standards of living from health to personal safety, the government of Nicolás Maduro in Venezuela has doubled down on the populist solution of choice, blame the OTHERS: internal (petty bourgeois), external (the Empire) or/and a combination of both conspiring.  The lack of real solutions to the country's increasing problems, however has led to increased autocratic measures and can lead to even more irrational vitriol and actions targeting the US.
Mr. Maduro is a colorful character. Chasing the shadow of his more charismatic and even more colorful mentor, the late Hugo Chávez, he cannot live up to the idolized vision of a dead leader. He has tried: in dynastic, electoral mode, he called himself "The Son of Chávez"; he claims that the spirit of Chávez talks to him in the form of a little bird; he plays the Cuatro (a variation of the ukulele) during rallies; he mimics the affected paternalistic and condescending speech patterns of the late Chávez in press conferences and intervened TV programming (cadenas).
 
The nostalgic view of the Chavistas will always render Maduro as inadequate. Chavismo fooled a great majority of people some of the time and still some has some fooled all of the time (for more on this read my previous essay-- With a Heavy Heart: Facing the Failures of Chavismo). But the intractable problems of the economy and society that face Maduro now are direct consequence of Chavismo.  The festive party with no realistic vision of tomorrow that Chávez led, buoyed by high priced oil used to buy and curry favors from fair weather friends, is over. Now it is time to pay the piper.

Caudillismo on Steroids.

The leader cult runs deep in Venezuela. From the time of Simon Bolivar, and with roots in Spanish King authority, strong leaders have been venerated in a quasi religious manner, adding them to the Santeria pantheon that underlies popular beliefs.  Santeria is a mixture of Afro-Caribbean, American (Venezuelan) Indian and Christian rituals with an Earth Goddess named Maria Leonza at its center. It is said that most if not all Venezuelan presidents have had links of one sort or another to this undercurrent culture.  Not by coincidence, a similar cult exists in Cuba where Maria Leonza is substituted by their own Sea-Earth Goddess, Yemayá.
This idolatry of the leader, of course, is not a Venezuela exclusive and North Korea once again comes to mind, particularly in its close association with religious practice.  While nominally a secular atheist state, devotion to the Supreme Leader has replaced traditional organized religion.  This devotion has a name, Juche, centered on the cult of the Kim dynasty. According to Juche teachings, life after death exists only if the society that defined that life is continued. The Juche calendar begins with patriarch Kim Il-Sung's birth in 1912.
The cozy relationship begun with Chávez between North Korea and Venezuela deepened under Maduro, with the announcement in October 2013 of a reopening of the North Korean Embassy in Caracas and a cooperation agreement between the legislative chambers. In typical flamboyant rhetoric of insecure autocratic regimes, the newly appointed NK ambassador to Venezuela, Jon Yong-Jin, is reported to have said that "if the US government dared to engage in a military attack on Venezuela, North Korea would not think twice before joining the fight against the empire". (Aporrea)
Not much has been heard from Ambassador Jon since his recall to North Korea after his brother in law Jang Sung-Taek, who was also Kim Jong-Un's uncle, was executed by the Supreme Leader by feeding him to angry dogs in December 2013. Kim was purging his government of enemies out to get him.
Paranoia, imagined plots and savage repression come with the unbridled actions of the "supreme" be it Leader or Commander (as in the case of Chávez). Since his ascension to power in 2013, Maduro has claimed to have uncovered dozens of coup and anti government conspiracies. Usually when public opinion of the government needs a boost. Conspirators in his little red book have included journalists, store owners, former ambassadors, and student leaders. All, of course, aided and abetted by the US and their cadre of gringo-loving local business men. In his latest uncovered counterrevolutionary plot, he arrested four missionaries from North Dakota plotting to undermine the health system of the country. A few months ago it was the turn of the head of a major hospital alerting to possible pandemics due to the shortages of health supplies of all sorts.
Feverish hatred and paranoia can lead to bad decisions and consequences for all parties.  The repressive nature of the Venezuelan regime is reaching new heights. From the mundane, such as HR memos in state owned enterprises urging fellow workers to denounce anyone they know traveling to the US, to the unabashed, such as arrests of high profile opposition leaders detained on trumped up charges and held indefinitely awaiting arraignment and trial. Other less prominent opponents from the working and student populations are routinely arrested and recorded as enemies of the state, to be harassed and black balled in employment and school under the watchful eye of Chavismo.  Read more here about Democracy under Chavismo.
Public protests are now, by government decree, (un)lawfully squashed with live ammo. In a recent incident a fourteen year old boy, Kluiverth Roa, huddled and scared behind a car after running away from the repressed protest march, was shot point blank in the head by a police officer in charge of stopping the protests. And those are the incidents that make the news. While that particular victim's family may get a modicum of redress, the population at large gets the message: repression is here to stay.
Kluiverth Roa, Murdered by a Shot to the Head

Survival Mode.

The shattered economy is evident in the streets, where shop owners big and small are constantly harassed while protected peddlers thrive in a corrupt black market of goods sold way over their regulated prices. Byzantine foreign exchange regulations and the collapse in oil revenues has led to scarcity of essential goods and foods in a country where local production has been all but squashed by Chavista zealotry. Hard to find products include sanitary napkins, toilet paper and, of course, medicines and medical supplies of all sorts.  The collapse of health care has forced many to increasingly rely on home medicines and witchcraft solutions.  The slogan "Socialist Fatherland or Death" used by Chavez rings so true now.

Army Captain Diosdado Cabello
The "Cartel de los Soles" (Cartel of the Suns, named for the insignias of Generals) --the military led narcotrafficking ring-- keeps a firm grip on the government and represses any possible military dissension. From its beginning, in association the Colombian narco-guerrilla FARC, top elements in the military establishment first protected and then appropriated the drug business in the region. Former Vice-President and now National Assembly Speaker, Capt. (act.) Diosdado Cabello was Chavez's liaison with the FARC and is now a leading figure in this cartel (For a reported chronology of the growth of Venezuela as a Military Drug State, follow the links at the end of this essay).

The social contract is a shambles by Chavez's own creations: the Social Missions and "Colectivos". These are groups of die hard Chavistas set up in neighborhoods to enforce Chavista rule. These groups in many cases have become gangs that terrorize their charges and fight each other. In a high profile case a leading and rising young Chavista star, Assembly Member Roberto Serra, was recently stabbed to death by members of his own bodyguards composed of Mission thugs in a rivalry dispute of some kind.


The colectivos have become a de-facto militia, armed, trained and supported institutionally, and called upon when needed to repress anti-government protests. But this dragon nurtured by the regime needs to be fed and Maduro has a hard time complying. The recent death of an outspoken colectivo leader, Jose Odreman, under a hail of police bullets, came shortly after he was denouncing Maduro's wavering to Chavista principles.

The ingredients for desperation moves are all there. Political intrigue, massive corruption and a repressed population make for a simmering cauldron that President Maduro is well aware of. He needs to cater to his core base of dyed-in-the-wool Chavistas that maintain the Panglossian virtues of socialist Chavista principles. This faction pulls him away from any possible compromise that could affect the unsustainable favor-purchasing economic policies that are at the core of Chavismo --and populism in general.

Given such conditions, distractions are in order.  Repeated ad-nauseam uncovered coup plots form the continuing saga of Maduro's tenure. He uses these supposed revelations to justify repressive moves towards the population and opposition leaders, and dramatically accuses "The Empire" of attempting to strike him down. His latest move, forcing the US Embassy to all but shut down with a skeleton crew of 17 accredited officers, issuing (laughable) travel bans to a who's who list in American politics and increasing travel restrictions for US citizens into Venezuela, follows a pattern of growing aggression towards the US which, despite it all, is Venezuela's still biggest trading partner and source of hard currency. 

After returning home empty handed from a beggar's tour of Venezuela's allies, China, Russia, Iran and the Arab world, Maduro in contradictory statements said "God will provide" while claiming success. He even announced an odd plan to help Qatar import foodstuffs from Venezuela --disregarding the fact that there is no home grown food in Venezuela. In his visit to Iran he reiterated the strong ties between both countries, ties that may weaken if the US succeeds in reestablishing diplomatic relations with that country. 

 The Cuba-US "apertura" further isolates Venezuela and Maduro, the face of Chavismo, faces a lonely future indeed. Maduro may not prevail but Chavismo, true to its Marxist-Leninist roots, will continue to crush opposition and not give an inch, regardless of its figurehead. Venezuela's closest remaining ally will be North Korea, sympathetic to Chavismo's struggle against the Empire, and a model to follow in socialist rule. Having a powerful common enemy, a shattered populace and similar messianic tendencies make these regimes find common ground to support each other; and possibly act in concert in accordance to the madness of their leadership.

 

Cartel de Los Soles: Venezuela's Government Protected Drug Cartel.

2015 - DEA and US Attorneys build their cases against high ranking government officials - The Wall Street Journal

2015 – National Assembly President and former Vice President, Capt. (Army, Act.) Diosdado Cabello: http://interamericansecuritywatch.com/diosdado-cabellos-head-of-security-defects-to-the-u-s-and-accuses-him-of-narcotrafficking/





2005  - Getting rid of the competition: http://venezuelanalysis.com/news/1279

All images copyright their respective owners.

 

domingo, 20 de abril de 2014

Venezuela: A Call for Democracy

 
A repeated misinformation screed by Venezuelan government officials is that opposition plotters want to overthrow the government, trash the constitution and return to the failed policies of the pre-Chávez past. This refrain is used in public appearances and pronouncements under the Goebbels theory that if repeated enough, enough people will believe it to be the truth. Facts, however, belie these statements. Despite blatant electoral distortions, the opposition has repeatedly participated in elections. Opposition leaders have recognized the failings of the political model that led to the unrest of the 90’s, and in most instances defend the social net created under Chávez. Some, like the imprisoned Leopoldo López, have done community organizing to improve conditions in poor neighborhoods, using the Chávez model. That is the positive Chávez legacy: recognition of the need to redress social and economic disparities.

Negative aspects of that legacy include the virulent sectarian discourse used to belittle and prevaricate about the opposition and any perceived enemies. Chávez’s famous smelling of the sulfur in the UN, referring to President GW Bush, is pittance compared to the epithets and lies used against domestic opponents. A new low is the constant homo-hateful innuendos used by Maduro during the presidential campaign and to this day against his rival Henrique Capriles, as well as blatant dismissive sexism against opposition assemblywoman Maria Corina Machado.

Mud slinging could be comically entertaining if the stakes were not so high, as pervasive sectarian speech is a threat to any democracy. Belittling the opposition, characterizing opponents as enemies, and the call to “Socialist Homeland or Death!” used to end public appearances has created a fractured society—and is probably behind the disregard for life reflected in the 70 murders a day in 2013. Hate speech comes in many forms but is always a creeping social cancer.

Polls reflect a majority of Venezuelans consider their nation to be in crisis. In a recent Op-ed in the NYT Venezuela’s president, Nicolás Maduro, sought to defend his government and policies with facts supporting his position (Venezuela: A Call for Peace). But many of those facts are either outright misrepresentations or panglossian distortions. His sound-bite essay needs a reply with long facts.

Per Capita National Income and the GINI Coefficient, Revisited.

Economic and social numbers are sometimes difficult to read and with propaganda masters behind them can be obfuscating. Despite information limitations,however, inferences can be made that contradict Maduro’s assertions of increased social welfare under chavismo.

On its face, Gross National Income per Capita (GNI/pC) in Venezuela has increased from a little over $4,000 in 2004 up to almost $12,500 in 2012. During this period, it should be noted, the price of oil increased nearly 90%. The Gross National Income, as calculated by the World Bank, quantifies the GDP in local currency converted to US$ and adjusted for inflation. Unfortunately, the official GNI/pC may not reflect realities on the Venezuelan kitchen table.

It is illegal since 2010 to inform or publicize or use any ForEx number that is not the official rate of exchange, i.e. 6.30 bolivars per dollar. Brokers went to jail for posting “parallel market” exchange rates, and at least eight websites doing the same have local access blocked while their authors remain anonymous to avoid prosecution.  Any official number, such as the GNI/pC can legally only be calculated using that official exchange rate. 


In 2010 the parallel (black) market rate—the rate at which many businesses were forced to operate due to the Byzantine and corrupt bureaucratic entanglement that the dollar allocation system has engendered—went from 6.30 to 9.14 bolivars per dollar at year’s end. That, on its face, would imply a devaluation of close to 45%. It is estimated that the government itself has been deficit financing by intervening in black market transactions, supplying about 20% of commercially needed dollars. To be fair, not all transactions are in black market dollars, but if only 30% (including government participation) of them are, as companies and individuals are forced to this market for their needs, the estimated devaluation for 2010 would have been around 14%.



estimated supply
Value (rate) in 2004 (Bs per US$)
Bs 1.92




Official Rate 2010
Bs 6.30
70% of demand
“Black” Rate end of 2010
Bs 9.14
30% of demand
Weighted Value 2010
Bs 7.15

“Black” Devaluation Jan-Dec 2010
45%

“Black” Devaluation 2004 to 2010
376%

Weighted Devaluation Jan-Dec 2010
14%




Official Rate 2012
Bs 6.30
70% of demand
“Black” Rate end of 2012
Bs 17.33
30% of demand
Weighted Value 2012
Bs 9.61

Weighted Devaluation 2010 to 2012
53%




Official Rate 2013
Bs 6.30
65% of demand
“Black” Rate end of 2013
Bs 63.70
15% of demand
SICAD I (Preferential allocation rate)
Bs 10.00
25% of demand
Weighted Value 2013
Bs 20.19

Weighted Devaluation 2012-2013
110%


The same calculation implies a devaluation of over 52% by 2012, as the black market rate shot up to Bs 17.33 per dollar. What this means is a brutal recessive adjustment in the real GNI/pC from US$10,140 in 2009 to $5,916 in 2012, a 52% decrease in the official numbers. The seeds of chavista economic disaster were already bearing fruit during this period, under Chávez.

Lack of transparency and arcane multi-tier rates make it difficult to estimate accurate numbers but certainly a decrease in national income per capita has occurred. Even being generous, the Gross National Income per Capita was reduced at least by a third over 2010-2012.  In 2013, with a black market rate of 63.70 Bs per dollar, the estimated devaluation over 2012, notwithstanding the new preferential allocation rate tier, was around 120%. Maduro claims solutions are in the works to diminish the pressure on the currency, including a market-based auction rate, which at its launch placed free market dollars over 50 Bs per dollar, and a tourist/visitor rate, which in effect will extract hard currency from anyone visiting Venezuela (current black market rates - note: distribution of this information is illegal in Venezuela).

The pressure on the currency has a twofold origin. First, the productive sector collapsed; after a frenzy of repeated expropriations and takeovers, many industries and farm production shut down. This led to increased imports of even basic staples—flour, cooking oil, sanitary napkins... Second, the greatest generator of foreign currency, the oil company PDVSA, sells its products to the government which in turn barters oil for services or sells it below market prices in petro-diplomacy efforts. The government has not paid PDVSA and has a gigantic debt with the company: $23bn as per PDVSA’s 2012 financial statements.


This is not sound economic policy. The economic consequences threaten hyperinflation. The immediate result is negative wealth distribution and this is what the Coefficient of Equality of Income Distribution (GINI) reflects. Equal distribution of increasingly scant resources is not progress. The GINI coefficient for Venezuela (39 in 2011) indeed points to a greater equality in distribution of wealth than in the past, it is the same as countries like Mauritania and Malawi, more equal distribution than in the US and a little less than in Bhutan, India or Uzbekistan. But to use the GINI the way Mr. Maduro used it in his commentary (“Venezuela has consistently reduced inequality”) is to misrepresent it as an indicator of social progress. Unless the economy as a whole creates wealth (measured by proxy with GNI/pC), this coefficient is meaningless.

Claims of poverty reduction solely by chavista policies are also dubious at best.  Poverty and indigence have decreased in Venezuela, but ceteres paribus, likely it would have been the case regardless. Chile and Colombia, countries with similar societies, reduced poverty in the same magnitude if not greater than that of Venezuela, while not using anything close to the Chávez model. According to the World Bank between 2005 and 2011 poverty declined in Venezuela by 22.16%, while in Colombia and Chile it declined by 31.14% and 20.88% respectively. 

Indicators such as literacy and infant mortality (according to UNESCO) have had positive trends over more than forty years and, during chavismo, these trends continued. Education from elementary to graduate has always been free, as a constitutional right throughout the 20th century and before that by presidential decree promulgated by president Antonio Guzmán Blanco on June 27, 1870. Health care as a universal right has always existed in Venezuela and all governments have attempted to provide it in the past. These are not chavista achievements or ideals, as Maduro claims.

Reasserting policies to entrench chavismo, the Minister for Education, Héctor Rodríguez, recently said “it’s not as if we’re here to raise people out of poverty and have them become middle class squalids.” Squalid is the routine derisory term used by the government to describe the opposition. This statement was made while announcing mandatory rules for teaching Chávez-socialism, starting from Pre-K, in all schools, public, private or parochial. A continuous history rewrite.


Legitimacy of the Government and the Protests


“Since 1998, the movement founded by Hugo Chávez has won more than a dozen presidential, parliamentary and local elections through an electoral process that former American President Jimmy Carter has called ‘the best in the world.’ Recently, the United Socialist Party (USP) received an overwhelming mandate in mayoral elections in December 2013, winning 255 out of 337 municipalities.”  Thus spake Maduro in the New York Times.


This statement has several problems. The USP in fact won 240 municipalities. The other 15 Maduro claims are from splinters from that unity, including so called “true chavistas” that reject him. Overall in those elections, the USP lost 23 municipalities to the non-leftist opposition. This opposition now holds 75 municipalities, including all major cities in the country. The Maduro regime has responded by curtailing access to federal services and depriving legally entitled funds to opposition municipalities; in the same way it has done to states held by opposition governors.

But the use of former President Carter to defend elections held in Venezuela is most egregious and upsetting. Maduro refers to a Carter speech from September 2012, yet fails to mention that it was regarding the technology of the balloting system. The article he links to is about the fully automated touch-screen voting system, developed in Venezuela, which uses thumbprint recognition technology and prints receipts to confirm voters’ choices.

Maduro fails to mention the Carter Center for Democracy findings on the 2012 and 2013 presidential elections summarized as: “There is not agreement, however, about the quality of the voting conditions and whether every registered voter is able to vote one time, and only one time. In addition, the report finds a series of inequities in campaign conditions in terms of both access to financial resources and access to the media, which diminish the competitiveness of elections, particularly in a legal framework that permits indefinite reelection of public officials.”

It is noteworthy that in 2003 a drive to recall then president Chávez was sponsored by the opposition. Over three million signatures were gathered. Hugo Chávez announced in February 2004 that the list of names had been seized by the government. The list was published on-line and, in effect, became an enemies list with many signatories fired from their jobs, expelled from their schools and generally persecuted in an electoral intimidation tactic by the regime to fight the recall referendum later that year.  To this day, intimidation continues.

In April of 2013 the special election called on account of Chávez’s death resulted in the election of Nicolas Maduro, his hand picked successor. The official results were 50.61% to 49.12%, a difference of close to 230,000 votes over opposition leader Henrique Capriles. Despite calls by the opposition for a full recount and requests by UNASUR and the OAS for the same, the National Electoral Council, stacked by government loyalists, did a selective sampling audit and certified the results. The opposition has never conceded the legitimacy of this election, only acknowledged the de facto regime. In light of the Carter Center report regarding the abusive use of incumbency and media by the government and the continued intimidation of the electorate, these results at the very least are suspect, reflect a souring of chavismo among the population, and indicate massive opposition to the regime.

The legitimacy of the incumbent Maduro’s ascension—notwithstanding birther claims by the opposition—is constitutionally questionable.  Article 229 prohibits the vice president or any governor from being elected president.  Henrique Capriles resigned as Governor of Miranda state on June 6, 2012 to run against Chávez to whom he lost in October. Capriles was reelected governor in December 2012 and subsequently ran against Vice President Maduro upon Chávez’s death. No record of Capriles’ resignation for this election is available but that does not give Maduro a free pass. Any waiver to either candidate would contravene the constitution.

On the other hand the protests on the streets are constitutionally protected not only by guarantees of freedom of speech and assembly. Article 350 recognizes the right of “the people of Venezuela… to disavow any regime, law or authority that goes against democratic values, principles and guarantees, or that infringes human rights.”

Besides the undermining of democratic values and principles described above, over the last two months there have been arrests of opposition leaders, divestiture of elected officials and at least 81 documented human rights violations. There is continued harassment to opposition newspapers through millionaire lawsuits and withholding of foreign currency to buy paper, and intimidation and outright closures of media in general, including CNN and the regional news channel NTN24.


An Illusion of Democracy

What began as a student protest against crime in the streets has become a festering unrest.  It is hard to gauge the scale of the protest because the government suppresses information, while the opposition magnifies and publicizes any incident. But by calling the recent round of exploratory meetings to create “dialogue” roundtables the government tacitly acknowledges there is a political crisis.

This call for dialogue is a savvy political move by Maduro to splinter the opposition, trick an international audience into believing in a mirage of conciliatory moves, and attempt to create a puppet opposition for an illusion of democracy. In 2002, after the failed coup against Chávez, similar talks were held and promises of tolerance made. Those promises were all broken by the regime. Signatories of that accord include the current president. The record is not good, but internationally talk of sanctions has been suspended while the “dialogue” unfolds. Dialogue talks--live on TV-- that began with Maduro asserting: “I am not here to negotiate or make any deals”.

Just because a regime holds elections it does not mean it is a functioning democracy. Otherwise places such as North Korea, Cuba, Syria, Saddam’s Iraq and Mubarak’s Egypt would be considered showcases of democracy with reportedly massive happy voter turnout. As of Jan. 2014 Venezuela was ranked 133rd out of 150 countries in the World Democracy Profile by Worldaudit.org., labeled a “hybrid regime” (ranks below “flawed democracy”) by the Economist Intelligence Unit, and ranked 121 out of 128 in the BTI (Bertelsmann Stiftung’s Transformation Index) measure of democracy and freedom.


National Assembly Member Maria Corina Machado
leaves a rally attacked by tear gas.
Symptoms of lack of democracy include:jailing opponents, suppressing protests, repressive militias, media control,and a rigged electoral process. In a cynical turn of events on the same day President Maduro’s essay “Venezuela: A Call for Peace” was published,opposition leader Maria Corina Machado was being tear gassed in a public rally and divested of her congressional seat. Venezuela is not a “participatory” democracy. At best it can be called a Totalitarian Democracy.

The situation in Venezuela has parallels to Iran 2009. At that time, after a contested election, images of popular protests and counter repression by government militias and hit squads filled TV screens and news outlets.Social media was awash with feeds of the protest. The death of Neda Agha-Soltan seared many an eye and there was a belief that change would come out of the sacrifice and pain of so many youths.
To this day Iran, a staunch Venezuela ally, remains under a totalitarian regime that keeps the peace with an iron fist.

----------------------------------------------------------
Background and references:

Leopoldo López:
WikiLeaks – LL goes to the Barrios to Gather Political Support: http://www.cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=09CARACAS1330&q=leopoldo-lopez
LL in Popular Barrio Forum: http://globovision.com/articulo/redes-populares-de-unt-debatieron-la-reforma-en-el-cementerio-2

Henrique Capriles
HC has Sex with Gorillas: http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/venezuela-president-pushes-back-using-bellicose-words-and-brute-force/2014/03/18/55357a74-aecf-11e3-b8b3-44b1d1cd4c1f_story.html
HC Leads a Homosexual Prostitution Ring: http://www.europapress.es/internacional/noticia-maduro-acusa-capriles-ser-complice-red-prostitucion-homosexual-20130815094350.html

Maria Corina Machado
MCM is an Empty Doll:  http://www.lapatilla.com/site/2013/09/06/en-la-pagina-de-an-llaman-a-maria-corina-machado-la-muneca-hueca-de-la-burguesia-imagen/
MCM Needs to Keep Her Place: http://caracaschronicles.com/2014/04/01/political-rape/
MCM is not Smart, Needs Help: http://www.aporrealos.com/forum/viewtopic.php?p=799773&sid=8f2b3eab6c3f893f033f99c5aa718be9
MCM is Pitiful: http://www.aporrea.org/oposicion/a186460.html

Illegal Dollars
New Law makes it Illegal to Buy/Sell Dollars as Commodities: http://www.correodelorinoco.gob.ve/tema-dia/ley-contra-ilicitos-cambiarios-evitara-que-se-trate-al-dolar-como-mercancia/
History of Foreign CurrencyExchange Regulations: http://www.monografias.com/trabajos13/monodef/monodef.shtml
Failed Attempts to Curtail Black Market Dollars: http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2014/02/27/how-a-sensible-economic-policy-might-have-sparked-venezuelas-protests/
Arbitrage and the Bolivar: https://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/the-law-of-unintended-consequences-sitme-and-venezuelas-currency-market/
Currency Inflation: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-03-25/venezuela-s-credit-rating-cut-by-fitch-on-inflation-currency.html
History of Bolivar devaluations: http://www.monedasdevenezuela.net/articulos/cronologia-de-la-devaluacion-del-bolivar-venezolano/
Historic Value/Black Market Rates of the Bolivar: http://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anexo:Cotizaci%C3%B3n_hist%C3%B3rica_del_bol%C3%ADvar_venezolano
Economic Snapshot Venezuela 2013: http://www.slideshare.net/miguelangelsantos/perspectivas-econmicas-de-venezuela-2013

Income and Income Distribution (GINI)
World Bank Data, Venezuela: http://data.worldbank.org/country/venezuela-rb
World Bank Data, Chile: http://data.worldbank.org/country/chile
World Bank Data, Colombia: http://data.worldbank.org/country/colombia
GINI Index, World: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2172.html
Our Goal is not to Make Squalids out of the Poor: http://www.eluniversal.com/nacional-y-politica/140225/rodriguez-no-vamos-a-sacarlos-de-la-pobreza-para-que-se-vuelvan-escual

Oil/Oil Prices
PDVSA Financial Statements: http://www.pdvsa.com/index.php?tpl=interface.sp/design/biblioteca/readdoc.tpl.html&newsid_obj_id=10919&newsid_temas=111
Historical Price of Oil, in Constant Dollars: http://inflationdata.com/inflation/inflation_rate/historical_oil_prices_table.asp

Industrial and Farming Collapse
Despite Official Numbers, Shortages Increase: http://www.eluniversal.com/economia/140101/shortage-prevailed-despite-increased-agriculture-production-in-venezue
Venezuela Economy in Numbers:http://www.indexmundi.com/venezuela/economy_profile.html
Structural Productivity Problems: http://transitions.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/07/20/venezuelas_productivity_problem

Elections
Electoral results, Municipal Elections 2013: http://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elecciones_municipales_de_Venezuela_de_2013
Official electoral results, Municipal and Presidential Elections 2013: http://www.eleccionesvenezuela.com/resultados-elecciones-venezuela.php
http://www.cne.gob.ve/resultado_presidencial_2013/r/1/reg_000000.html
Concentration and influence - undermining opposition districts; http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=13&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0CDMQFjACOAo&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.scielo.cl%2Fpdf%2Frevcipol%2Fv30n1%2Fart03.pdf&ei=eqBQU4XXHuH50gGStYGgBg&usg=AFQjCNFDBQAufFbiw933bnpgH6Nx8Aq_WQ
Municipal results 2013: http://www.infobae.com/2013/12/08/1529456-elecciones-venezuela-maduro-festeja-el-interior-pero-pierde-las-capitales
Carter Center for Democracy Report on Venezuela: https://www.cartercenter.org/news/pr/venezuela-070313.html
Carter speech in Atlanta: http://www.globalresearch.ca/former-us-president-carter-venezuelan-electoral-system-best-in-the-world/5305779
Human Rights Watch report on Chávez: http://www.hrw.org/reports/2008/venezuela0908/index.htm
Electoral enemies list by the Venezuela government (Human Rights Watch report) http://www.hrw.org/reports/2008/venezuela0908/2.htm#_Toc207173131

No Negotiation or Deals
The Implosion in the US’ Backyard: http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/jackson-diehl-venezuela-the-uprising-no-one-is-noticing/2014/03/03/19ab5828-9fc7-11e3-b8d8-94577ff66b28_story.html
The Revolution is Non-Negotiable: http://www.latercera.com/noticia/mundo/2014/04/678-573208-9-maduro-asegura-que-no-habra-negociacion-o-pactos-en-dialogo-con-oposicion.shtml
http://cnnespanol.cnn.com/2014/04/10/dialogovenezuela/comment-page-1/

Shutting Down the Opposition
Close the Radios: http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/08/01/venezuela-media-idUSN0146551720090801
Control Print Media: http://www.upi.com/Top_News/Special/2013/09/12/Venezuelas-press-faces-closures-as-newsprint-runs-out/UPI-96431379024223/
Not a Democracy: http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2013/venezuela#.U1CrF6JYOSo

Carlos J. Rangel
The Failures of Chavismo: https://www.facebook.com/notes/carlos-j-rangel/with-a-heavy-heart-facing-the-failures-of-chavismo/10153925730160417
The Social Explosion In Venezuela: https://www.facebook.com/notes/carlos-j-rangel/the-social-explosion-in-venezuela/10153826072310417
Blogspot – On Iran 2009: http://carlosjrangel.blogspot.com/2009/09/selected-essays-on-iran-election.html
Campaign Journal 2008: http://books.google.com/books?id=MokNZ2AiVO0C&printsec=frontcover&dq=campaign+journal+2008&cd=1#v=onepage&q&f=false

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